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Abstract. In this note we study the effect of adding fixed points to jus-
tification logics. We introduce two extensions of justification logics: exten-
sions by fixed point (or diagonal) operators, and extensions by least fixed
points. The former is a justification version of Smoryn`ski’s Diagonalization
Operator Logic, and the latter is a justification version of Kozen’s modal µ-
calculus. We also introduce fixed point extensions of Fitting’s quantified logic
of proofs, and formalize the Knower Paradox and the Surprise Test Paradox
in these extensions. By interpreting a surprise statement as a statement for
which there is no justification, we give a solution to the self-reference ver-
sion of the Surprise Test Paradox in quantified logic of proofs. We also give
formalizations of the Surprise Test Paradox in timed modal epistemic logics,
and in Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic.
Keywords: Justification logic, Fixed point, µ-calculus, Provability logic,
Timed modal epistemic logic, Quantified logic of proofs, Surprise Test Para-
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1 Introduction
Justification logics provide a framework for reasoning about mathematical proofs
and epistemic justifications. Justification logics evolved from a logic called Logic of
Proofs LP, introduced by Sergei Artemov in [3, 4], which try to give an arithmetic
semantics for modal logic S4 and intuitionistic logic, and formalize the Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogrov semantics of intuitionistic logic. Justification logics are exten-
sions of classical logics by justification assertions t : F , which is read as “t is a
justification for F .” Some of the justification logics enjoy the arithmetical com-
pleteness theorem, with the provability semantics of t : F as “t is a proof of F in
Peano arithmetic PA.”
Justification logics could be also considered as logics of knowledge, and are con-
tributed to the study of Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. In this respect
LP can be also viewed as a refinement of the epistemic logic S4, in which knowability
operator A (A is known) is replaced by explicit knowledge operators t : A (“F
is known for reason t”). The exact correspondence between LP and S4 is given by
the Realization Theorem: all occurrences of  in a theorem of S4 can be replaced
by suitable terms to produce a theorem of LP, and vice versa. Regarding this the-
orem, LP is called the justification counterpart of S4. The justification counterpart
of other modal logics were also developed (see e.g. [13, 28, 30]).
Since some of the justification logics enjoy the arithmetical completeness theo-
rem, it is natural to ask if the ability of constructing self-reference statements in
PA, by means of the Go¨del’s Fixed Point (or Diagonal) Lemma, can be simulated
in justification logics. In the context of language, a statement is self-reference if it
refers to itself or its referent. The Fixed Point Lemma in PA enables us to construct
sentences which behaves like the self-reference sentences. Such a self-reference state-
ments have been used to show important results in PA and arise significant philo-
sophical issues, e.g. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems (by constructing a sentence
which state its own unprovability), Tarski’s undefinability of truth (by construct-
ing a sentence which state its own falsity, the Liar Paradox), Kaplan-Montague’s
Knower Paradox (by constructing a sentence which state its own unknowability).
In the framework of modal logics, the Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic GL is one
of the well-known modal logics which is arithmetically complete. The fixed point
lemma is formulated in GL by the De Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem. Most of
the proofs of the De Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem employs the property of
Substitution of Equivalents
A↔ B
C[A]↔ C[B]
SE
for a context C[ ]. The proof of SE in modal logics requires the Regularity rule
A↔ B
A↔ B
Reg
Obviously the justification version of the Regularity rule does not hold in justifica-
tion logics
A↔ B
t : A↔ t : B
JReg
In other words, two equivalent statements have not necessarily the same justifica-
tions (see [26] for a version of SE in the logic of proofs). Thus, instead of proving a
fixed point theorem in the framework of justification logics, we extend the language
and axioms of justification logics by fixed point formulas and fixed point axioms
respectively. We consider two extensions of justification logics: extensions by fixed
point (or diagonal) operators, and extensions by least (and greatest) fixed points.
The former is a justification version of Smoryn`ski’s Diagonalization Operator Logic
[53], and the latter is a justification version of Kozen’s modal µ-calculus [37]. In
this paper, we do not introduce any semantics for these extensions. However, the
consistency of some of these extensions are shown by translating them into their
counterpart modal logics.
We also introduce fixed point extensions of Fitting’s quantified logic of proofs
[25], and formalize the Knower Paradox and the Surprise Test Paradox in these
extensions. By interpreting a surprise statement as a statement for which there
is no justification, we give a solution to the one-day case self-reference version of
the Surprise Test Paradox in quantified logic of proofs. To this end, we give a
simple semantics (single-world Kripke models) for quantified logic of proofs. We
also show that the one-day case non-self-reference version of the paradox is an
epistemic blindspot for students (cf. [55]).
2
2 Fixed points in arithmetic
In this section we recall some well known consequences of the Fixed Point Lemma
(or Diagonal Lemma) in extensions of Peano Arithmetic PA.1 In this paper we do
not distinguish between the number n and its numeral n¯. The Go¨del number of
formula A is denoted by pAq. The following (generalized) Fixed Point Lemma is
taken from [11].
Lemma 2.1 (Fixed Point Lemma). Let T be a theory extending PA. For every
formula ϕ(x, y1, . . . , yn) there exists a formula D(y1, . . . , yn) such that
T ⊢ D(y1, . . . , yn)↔ ϕ(pD(y1, . . . , yn)q, y1, . . . , yn).
This lemma enables us to formalize self-references sentences in PA. Go¨del uses
this lemma2 to construct a sentence in PA which states “I am not provable in PA.”
Theorem 2.1 (Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem). Let T be a recursively ax-
iomatized complete theory extending PA. Then T is inconsistent.
Proof. Go¨del constructed a proof predicate Proof(x, y) in T such that for every
formula ϕ:
T ⊢ ϕ iff T ⊢ Proof(n, pϕq), for some n ∈ N. (1)
Let Prov(x) stand for (∃y)Proof(y, x). It is easy to show that
T ⊢ ϕ iff T ⊢ Prov(pϕq). (2)
Now by the Fixed Point Lemma there is a sentence G (Go¨del’s sentence for T) such
that
T ⊢ G ↔ ¬Prov(pGq). (3)
Since T is assumed to be complete, then either T ⊢ G or T ⊢ ¬G. We will show that
in either case T is inconsistent.
If T ⊢ G, then by (2) we have T ⊢ Prov(pGq). Next by (3) we obtain T ⊢ ¬G.
Thus, T proves both G and ¬G.
If T ⊢ ¬G, then by (3) we have T ⊢ Prov(pGq). Next by (2) we obtain T ⊢ G.
Thus, T proves both G and ¬G. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2.2 (Tarski’s Undefinability of Truth). Let T be a theory extending
PA, and Tr(x) be a truth predicate, i.e a predicate with one free variable x such that
for every sentence A
Tr. T ⊢ A↔ Tr(pAq).
Then T is inconsistent.
Proof. 1. D ↔ ¬Tr(pDq), by the Fixed Point Lemma
2. D ↔ Tr(pDq), by Tr
1 All the results also hold for extensions of Robinson arithmetic Q.
2 As pointed out by Mendelson [43], the Fixed Point Lemma was implicit in the paper of
Go¨del [29], and it seems first explicitly mentioned by Carnap [14].
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3. Tr(pDq)↔ ¬Tr(pDq), contradiction. ⊓⊔
In fact, the sentence D in D ↔ ¬Tr(pDq) correspond to the Liar Sentence:
“This statement is false”
and the argument given in the proof of Tarski’s theorem, which expresses that the
Liar Sentence is true if and only if it is not, is known as the Liar Paradox. The
scheme Tr is called the Tarski biconditional or T-scheme. Note that, by (2), the
provability predicate Prov(x) satisfies the T-scheme.
In the following we consider the Surprise Test Paradox. This paradox first pub-
lished by O’Connor [47] with the name “Class A blackout.” In the following we
give the more common formulation of the paradox, the Surprise Test (or Examina-
tion) Paradox, which is given by Weiss [61] (under a different name “the prediction
paradox”). For a survey of the paradox see [16, 57].
The two-day case of this paradox is as follows:
“A teacher announces that there will be exactly one surprise test onWednes-
day or Friday next week. A student objects that this is impossible. If the
test is given on Friday, then on Thursday I would be able to predict that the
test is on Friday. It would not be a surprise. The test could not be given on
Wednesday too. Because on Tuesday I would know that the test will not be
on Friday (as shown in the previous reasoning) and therefore I could foresee
that the test will be on Wednesday. Again a test on Wednesday would not
be a surprise. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a surprise test.”
The one-day case of the paradox is as follows:
“You will have a test tomorrow that will take you by surprise, i.e. you can’t
know it beforehand”
As it is clear from the above formulations of the paradox, “surprise test” is defined
in terms of what can be known. Specifically, a test is a surprise for a student if
and only if the student cannot know beforehand which day the test will occur.
The precise formulation of (non-self-reference) n-day case of the paradox requires
temporalized knowledge operators in the language. A formalization of the student’s
argument in the two-day case in timed modal epistemic logics is given in Appendix
A.
Some authors interpret the surprise (or knowledge) in this paradox in terms of
deducibility. Specifically, a test is a surprise for a student if and only if the student
cannot deduce logically beforehand the date of the test. This interpretation was first
proposed by Shaw [52]. Regarding deducibility in PA, Fitch [21] resolved the paradox
by reinterpreting the surprise so that “what is intended in practice is not that the
surprise event will be a surprise whenever it occurs, but only when it occurs on some
day other than the last”. He formulated the announcement with this interpretation
and claim that it is “apparently self-consistent” in PA. Nevertheless, Kripke [35]
shows that the statement of Fitch’s resolution is actually refutable in PA. Fitch
also show the relation between a version of the Surprise Test Paradox and Go¨del’s
first incompleteness theorem. Kritchman and Raz [36] also show the relationship
between the paradox and Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. They conclude
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that “if the students believe in the consistency of T + S, the exam cannot be held
on Friday [i.e. the last day], ... However, the exam can be held on any other day of
the week because the students cannot prove the consistency of T +S” (where T can
be taken PA, and S is the statement of teacher’s announcement). The formalization
of these results in Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic are presented in Appendix B.
The self-reference version of the paradox (adopted from [20, 34]) is as follows:
“Unless you know this statement to be false, you will have a test tomorrow,
but you can’t know from this statement that you will have a test tomorrow.”
The above version of the paradox is called the Examiner Paradox in [20]. E`gre`
defined a knowledge predicate as a predicate satisfying the principle of knowledge
veracity: K(pAq) → A, for every sentence A. Now, using a knowledge predicate,
the Examiner Paradox is formalized as follows:
D ↔ (K(p¬Dq) ∨ (E ∧ ¬K(pD → Eq))), (4)
where E denotes the sentence “you will have a test tomorrow.” Using (4), E`gre`
proved the following.
Theorem 2.3 ([20]). Let T be a theory extending PA, with I(x, y) a formula ex-
pressing derivability between formulas of T , and K(x) a unary predicate such that
for every sentence A
T. K(pAq)→ A,
U. K(pK(pAq)→ Aq),
I. K(pAq) ∧ I(pAq , pBq)→ K(pBq),
R. K(pT ∧ U ∧ Iq).
Then T is inconsistent.
Assumptions U, I, and R could be replaced with a stronger assumption, a rule
similar to the modal necessitation rule, as follows.
Theorem 2.4. Let T be a theory extending PA, and K(x) a unary predicate such
that for every sentence A
T. K(pAq)→ A,
Nec. If T ⊢ A, then T ⊢ K(pAq),
Then T is inconsistent.
Proof. 1. D ↔ (K(p¬Dq) ∨ (E ∧ ¬K(pD → Eq))), by the Fixed Point Lemma
2. K(p¬Dq)→ ¬D, by T
3. D → ¬K(p¬Dq), by 2 and propositional reasoning
4. D → (E ∧ ¬K(pD → Eq)), by 1, 3 and propositional reasoning
5. D → E, by 4 and propositional reasoning
6. D → ¬K(pD → Eq), by 4 and propositional reasoning
7. K(pD → Eq), by 5 and Nec
8. ¬D, by 6, 7 and propositional reasoning
9. K(p¬Dq), by 8 and Nec
5
10. D, by 1, 9 and propositional reasoning
11. ⊥, by 8 and 10. ⊓⊔
Now we consider the zero-day case Surprise Test Paradox, which is known as
the Knower Paradox. It is formulated as D ↔ K(p¬Dq) that states:
“This statement is known to be false”
or as D ↔ ¬K(pDq) that states:
“Nobody knows this statement to be true”
The original formulation of the Knower Paradox presented by Kaplan and Montague
in [34], and basically is the epistemological counterpart of the Liar Paradox.
Theorem 2.5 (The Knower Paradox, [34]). Let T be a theory extending PA,
with I(x, y) a formula expressing derivability between formulas of T , and K(x) a
unary predicate such that for every sentence A and B
T. K(pAq)→ A,
U. K(pK(pAq)→ Aq),
I. K(pAq) ∧ I(pAq , pBq)→ K(pBq).
Then T is inconsistent.
Similar to the Tarski’s Undefinability of Truth (Theorem 2.2), the Knower Para-
dox can be seen as the Arithmetic Undefinability of Knowledge. The following variant
of the Knower Paradox is given by Montague in [44].
Theorem 2.6 ([44]). Let T be a theory extending PA, and K(x) a unary predicate
such that for every sentence A
T. K(pAq)→ A,
Nec. If T ⊢ A, then T ⊢ K(pAq).
Then T is inconsistent.
Proof. 1. D ↔ ¬K(pDq), by the Fixed Point Lemma
2. K(pDq)→ D, by T
3. K(pDq)→ ¬K(pDq), by 1, 2 and propositional reasoning
4. ¬K(pDq), by 3 and propositional reasoning
5. D, by 1, 4 and propositional reasoning
6. K(pDq), by 5 and Nec
7. ⊥, by 4, 6 and propositional reasoning. ⊓⊔
Note that Theorem 2.6 is a generalization of Theorem 2.2, since every truth predi-
cate is a knowledge predicate satisfying also the rule Nec.
Finally, we give the following version of the Believer Paradox from [20].
Theorem 2.7. Let T be a theory extending PA, and B(x) a unary predicate such
that for every sentence F and G
K. B(pF → Gq)→ (B(pFq)→ B(pGq)),
4. B(pFq)→ B(pB(pFq)q),
D. B(p¬Fq)→ ¬B(pFq),
Nec. If T ⊢ F , then T ⊢ B(pFq).
Then T is inconsistent.
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3 Fixed points in modal logics
In this section, we recall two kind of extensions of modal logics with fixed points:
fixed point (or diagonal) extensions of modal logics where first introduced by Smoryn`ski
in [53], and modal µ-calculus (modal fixed point logics) where first introduced by
Kozen in [37]. We first recall definitions of normal modal logics.
Modal formulas are constructed by the following grammar:
A ::= p | ⊥ | ¬A | A ∧ A | A ∨ A | A→ A | A,
where p is a propositional variable, ⊥ is the propositional constant for falsity. As
usual, ♦A is defined as ¬¬A.3
The basic modal logic K has the following axiom schemes and rules:
Taut. All propositional tautologies,
K. (A→ B)→ (A→ B),
The rules of inference are Modus Ponens and Necessitation rule:
MP. from ⊢ A and ⊢ A→ B, infer ⊢ B.
Nec. from ⊢ A, infer ⊢ A.
Other modal logics are obtained by adding the following axiom schemes to K in
various combinations:
T. A→ A.
D. A→ ♦A
4. A→ A.
B. ¬A→ ¬A.
5. ¬A→ ¬A.
In this paper we consider the following 15 normal modal logics: K, T, D, K4, KB, K5,
KB5, K45, D5, DB, D4, D45, TB, S4, S5. The name of each modal logic indicates the
list of its axioms, except S4 and S5 which can be named KT4 and KT45, respectively.
The axiom D is equivalent (over K) to ⊥ → ⊥.
The Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic GL has a central role here. GL is obtained from
K4 (or K) by adding the Lo¨b axiom scheme:
(A→ A)→ A
It is known that GL is complete with respect to provability interpretation of 
in PA. More precisely, define the arithmetical interpretation ∗ as a mapping from
propositional variables to sentences of PA, such that ⊥∗ = ⊥, ∗ commutes with
propositional connectives, and (A)∗ = Prov(pA∗q). The modal logic K4 is sound
with respect to arithmetical interpretations (see [11, 53]). Moreover, Solovay [54]
shows that GL is sound and complete.
Theorem 3.1 (Solovay Arithmetical Completeness, [54]). GL ⊢ F iff PA ⊢
F ∗, for every arithmetical interpretation ∗.
3 We adopt the following decreasing order of strength of the connectives: ¬,,∧,∨,→.
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3.1 Modal logics with fixed point operators
Suppose ML is a propositional modal logic defined over a language L. We write
A(p, q1, . . . , qn) to denote that p, q1, . . . , qn are all the propositional variables occur-
ring in the formula A. An occurrence of a propositional variable p in the formula
A(p, q1, . . . , qn) is called modalized if p occurs in the scope of a modal operator  or
♦. Let L(FP) be the extension of L by n-ary fixed point operators (or diagonal op-
erators) δA(q1, . . . , qn) for each L-formula A(p, q1, . . . , qn) in which p is modalized.
The fixed point extension (or diagonal extension) ML(FP) of modal logic ML in the
language L(FP) is an extension of ML by axiom schemes
δA(B1, . . . , Bn)↔ A(δA(B1, . . . , Bn), B1, . . . , Bn),
where B1, . . . , Bn are L(FP)-formulas.
Using fixed point extensions of modal logics we can give the analogs of the
Knower and the Believer Paradoxes.
Theorem 3.2 (The Knower Paradox in the framework of modal logics).
Let ML be a propositional modal logic which contain the axiom scheme
T. A→ A,
then ML(FP) is inconsistent.
Proof. The proof is obtained from the proof of Theorem 2.6 by replacing the knowl-
edge predicate K by . ⊓⊔
Theorem 3.3 (The Believer Paradox in the framework of modal logics).
Let ML be a propositional normal modal logic which contain the axiom schemes
D. A→ ♦A,
4. A→ A
then ML(FP) is inconsistent.
Thus, for example, the systems T(FP), S4(FP), and D4(FP) are inconsistent.
On the other hand, by the De Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem, K4(FP) is a
conservative extensions of GL, and hence K4(FP) is consistent.
Theorem 3.4 (De Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem, [11, 53]). For any
GL-formula A(p, q¯) in which p is modalized, there exists a unique formula D(q¯) such
that
GL ⊢ D(q¯)↔ A(D(q¯), q¯).
Smoryn`ski in [53] showed that K4(FP) is a conservative extensions of GL.4
Theorem 3.5 ([53]). Given any GL-formula A, the following are equivalent:
– GL ⊢ A.
– K4(FP) ⊢ A.
4
K4(FP) is called the Diagonalization Operator Logic DOL, in [53].
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In fact GL is a modal logic with built-in fixed point property (the Fixed Point
Lemma of arithmetic is modally expressible in GL by the De Jongh-Sambin Fixed
Point Theorem). In GL the following is provable
(A→ A)↔ A. (5)
Thus A is the fixed point of B(p) = (p → A). As it is pointed out in [51],
the De Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem shows that “how the single instance
LF [here the fixed point equation (5)] is sufficient to yield the strongest version of
diagonalization expressible in the language of modal logic.”
There are other modal logics with the fixed point property:
– Go¨del-Lo¨b-Solovay provability logic GLS introduced by Solovay in [54]. Axioms
of GLS are all theorems of GL and the axiom scheme A→ A, and its only rule
of inference is Modus Ponens. E`gre` in [20] claims that GLS gives a solution to
the Knower Paradox via a hierarchy of rules (Modus Ponens could be applied
to all theorems, while Necessitation rule could be applied only to theorems of
GL).
– Sacchetti in [50] introduced two families of modal logics with the fixed point
property: K+ (nA→ A)→ A, for n ≥ 1, and K +n⊥, for n ≥ 1, where
n denotes n consecutively occurrences of .
As mentioned in Section 2, some authors formalize the Surprise Test Paradox
in Peano arithmetic and interpret the surprise in terms of deducibility (see e.g.
[52, 21, 36]). Regarding Solovay arithmetical completeness of GL, it is possible to
formalize the paradox in GL, see Appendix B.
3.2 Modal µ-calculus
Modal µ-calculus [12, 33, 37] is a logic used extensively in certain areas of com-
puter science. It was first introduced by Kozen in [37]. The language of the modal
µ-calculus is an extension of the language of modal logic with variable binding oper-
ator µp (the least fixed point operator). The expression µp.A is intended to present,
by the Knaster-Tarski theorem, the least fixed point of the operator naturally as-
sociated with the formula A(p).
Theorem 3.6 (Knaster-Tarski). Given a set S, any monotone operator Φ
Φ : P(S)→ P(S)
within the ordering (P(S),⊆) has a least fixed point and a greatest fixed point.
Formulas of modal mu-calculus are constructed by the following grammar:
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧ A | A | µp.A,
provided that every free occurrence of p is positive in A, i.e. every occurrence of
p in A occurs within the scope of an even number of negations (in this case we
say that A is p-positive). The system K(µ) is obtained from the basic modal logic
K by adding the closure axiom scheme and the induction rule, provided that A is
p-positive:
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µ-CL. A(µp.A(p))↔ µp.A(p),
µ-IND. from ⊢ A(B)→ B infer ⊢ µp.A(p)→ B.
The greatest fixed point operator is defined as follows:
νp.A := ¬µp.¬A(¬p).
The background modal logic K can be extended to other modal logics to obtain
consistent extensions of K(µ), such as S4(µ) and S5(µ). For more detailed exposition
see [12, 33].
Mardaev in [40] showed that special family of p-positive formulas has fixed points
in S4: for any S4-formula A(p,q1, . . . ,qn) in which p is positive, there exists a
formula D(q1, . . . ,qn) such that
S4 ⊢ D(q1, . . . ,qn)↔ A(D(q1, . . . ,qn),q1, . . . ,qn).
Mardaev also shows that every p-positive Σ-formula ϕ(p, q¯) has a fixed point
in K4 (cf. [38]), and every p-positive Π-formula ϕ(p, q¯) has a fixed point in GL (cf.
[39]). For the definitions of Σ- and Π-formulas and a survey of Mardaev’s results
see [41].
It is worth noting that the Knower Paradox cannot be formalized in the modal
µ-calculus, since we need the fixed point of the formula A(p) = ¬p in which p
is not positive. However, Halpern and Moses [31] formalized some versions of the
Surprise Test Paradox within a fixed point modal logic similar to modal µ-calculus.
3.3 Connections
The connection between GL and modal µ-calculus has been studied by authors.
Van Benthem in [9] showed that GL can be faithfully embedded into K(µ). He also
showed that
Theorem 3.7. The logics K(µ) + (A → A) → A and K(µ) + A → A+
µp.p are equivalent.
Since in the µ-calculus upward well-foundedness5 can be expressed by the for-
mula µp.p, the above theorem says that upward well-foundedness is modally de-
finable (by the Lo¨b axiom) together with transitivity.
Visser in [59] gave another interpretation of GL into K(µ). He also proved a
generalized fixed point property for GL.
Definition 3.1. A GL-formula ϕ(p) is semi-positive in p if all non-modalized oc-
currences of p are positive.
Theorem 3.8 ([59]). Any formula ϕ(p) that is semi-positive in p has an fixed
point in GL. Moreover, if all occurrences of p in ϕ(p) are positive, then the fixed
point of ϕ(p) is minimal.
Finally, Alberucci and Facchini in [1] showed that the modal µ-calculus over GL
collapses to GL. They also gave a new proof for the de Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point
Theorem in GL.
5 A relation R is upward well-founded if there exists no infinite sequence of worlds
w1, w2, . . . such that wiRwi+1 for i ≥ 1. It is known that upward well-foundedness
is not definable in basic modal logic (see e.g. [9]).
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4 Justification logics
The language of justification logics is an extension of the language of propositional
logic by the formulas of the form t : F , where F is a formula and t is a justifica-
tion term. Justification terms (or terms for short) are built up from (justification)
variables x, y, z, . . . (possibly with subscript) and (justification) constants a, b, c, . . .
(possibly with subscript) using several operations depending on the logic: (binary)
application ‘·’, (binary) sum ‘+’, (unary) verifier ‘!’, (unary) negative verifier ‘?’,
and (unary) weak negative verifier ‘?¯’. Justification formulas are constructed by the
following grammar:
A ::= p | ⊥ | ¬A | A ∧ A | A ∨A | A→ A | t : A,
where p is a propositional variable and t is a justification term.
We now begin with describing the axiom schemes and rules of the basic justi-
fication logic J, and continue with other justification logics. The basic justification
logic J is the weakest justification logic we shall be discussing. Other justification
logics are obtained by adding certain axiom schemes to J.
Definition 4.1. Axioms schemes of J are:
Taut. All propositional tautologies,
Sum. s : A→ (s+ t) : A , s : A→ (t+ s) : A,
jK. s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ (s · t) : B).
Other justification logics are obtained by adding the following axiom schemes to J
in various combinations:
jT. t : A→ A.
jD. t :⊥→⊥.
j4. t : A→!t : t : A,
jB. ¬A→ ?¯t : ¬t : A.
j5. ¬t : A→?t : ¬t : A.
All justification logics have the inference rule Modus Ponens, and the Iterated Axiom
Necessitation rule:
IAN. ⊢ cin : cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : A, where A is an axiom instance of the logic, cij ’s
are arbitrary justification constants and n ≥ 1.
The language of each justification logic includes those operations on terms that
are present in its axioms. Moreover, as in the case of modal logic, the name of each
justification logic is indicated by the list of its axioms. For example, JT4 is the
extension of J by axioms jT and j4, in the language containing term operations ·,
+, and !. JT4 is usually called the logic of proofs LP.
Remark 4.1. The rule IAN can be replaced by the following rule, called Axiom
Necessitation rule, in those justification logics that contain axiom j4:
AN. ⊢ c : A, where A is an axiom instance of the logic and c is an arbitrary
justification constant.
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Artemov used this rule in his formulation of the logic of proofs LP. We will use this
rule in the formulation of quantified logic of proofs in Section 6.
Definition 4.2. 1. Given a justification logic JL, the total constant specification
T CS of JL is the set of all formulas of the form cin : cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : A,
where n ≥ 1, A is an axiom instance of JL and cij ’s are arbitrary justification
constants.
2. A constant specification CS for JL is a subset of the total constant specification
of JL.
3. A constant specification CS is axiomatically appropriate if for each axiom in-
stance A of JL there is a constant c such that c : A ∈ CS, and if F ∈ CS then
c : F ∈ CS for some constant c.
Let JLCS be the fragment of JL where the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule only
produces formulas from the given CS. Thus JL∅ denotes the fragment of JL without
the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule. Note that the total constant specification
T CS is axiomatically appropriate.
The deduction theorem and substitution lemma holds in all justification logics.
Theorem 4.1 (Deduction Theorem). For a set of formulas S, we have JLCS ,
S, A ⊢ B if and only if JLCS , S ⊢ A→ B.
Lemma 4.1 (Substitution Lemma). If JLT CS , S ⊢ A, then for every justifi-
cation variable x and justification term t, we have JLT CS , S[t/x] ⊢ A[t/x], where
A[t/x] is the result of simultaneously replacing all occurrences of variable x in A by
term t. The same holds if JLT CS is replaced by JL∅.
The following lemma was first proved by Artemov in [4].
Lemma 4.2 (Lifting Lemma). Given an axiomatically appropriate constant spec-
ification CS for JL, if
JLCS , A1, . . . , An ⊢ F,
then for some justification term t(x1, . . . , xn) and justification variables x1, . . . , xn
JLCS , x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ⊢ t(x1, . . . , xn) : F.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of F . We have three base cases:
– If F is an axiom, then put t := c, for a justification constant c, and use rule
IAN to obtain c : F .
– If F = Ai, then put t := xi.
For the induction step we have two cases.
– Suppose F is obtained by Modus Ponens from G → F and G. By induction
hypothesis, there are terms u(x1, . . . , xn) and v(x1, . . . , xn) such that u : (G→
F ) and v : G are derivable from x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An. Then put t := u.v and use
the axiom jK to obtain u · v : F .
– Suppose F is obtained from Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule, so F = cin :
cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : B ∈ CS, for some axiom instance B. Then since CS is axiomat-
ically appropriate, there is a justification constant c such that c : cin : cin−1 :
. . . : ci1 : B ∈ CS. Thus, put t := c. ⊓⊔
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One of the important properties of justification logics is the internalization prop-
erty.
Lemma 4.3 (Internalization Lemma). Given an axiomatically appropriate con-
stant specification CS for JL, if JLCS ⊢ F , then there is a justification term t such
that JLCS ⊢ t : F .
Proof. Special case of Lemma 4.2. ⊓⊔
The following lemma is helpful. in the next section.
Lemma 4.4. JDT CS proves s : ¬A → ¬t : A, for every JD-formula A and terms
s, t.
Proof. 1. c : (¬A→ (A→ ⊥)), by IAN
2. c : (¬A→ (A→ ⊥))→ (s : ¬A→ c · s : (A→ ⊥)), an instance of jK
3. s : ¬A→ c · s : (A→ ⊥), from 1, 2 by MP
4. c · s : (A→ ⊥)→ (t : A→ (c · s) · t : ⊥), an instance of jK
5. (c · s) · t : ⊥ → ⊥, an instance of jD
6. c · s : (A→ ⊥)→ (t : A→ ⊥), from 4, 5 by propositional reasoning
7. s : ¬A→ ¬t : A, from 3, 6 by propositional reasoning. ⊓⊔
From the above lemma we obtain t : A → ¬s : ¬A in JD which is an analog of
modal axiom D, A→ ♦A.
In the sequel, we will state the precise connection between modal and justifi-
cation logics. For comparison, axioms and rules of LP and S4 are given in Table
1.
Modal logic S4 Logic of proofs LP
(A→ B)→ (A→ B) s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ s · t : B)
A→ A t : A→ A
A→ A t : A→!t : t : A
s : A ∨ t : A→ (s+ t) : A
⊢ A (Nec)
⊢ A
A is an axiom instance (AN)
⊢ c : A
Table 1. The correspondence between S4 and LP.
Definition 4.3. The forgetful projection ◦ is a mapping from the set of justification
formulas into the set of modal formulas, defined recursively as follows: p◦ := p,
(⊥)◦ := ⊥, ◦ commutes with propositional connectives, and (t : A)◦ := A◦. For a
set of justification formulas S, let S◦ = {F ◦ | F ∈ S}.
Theorem 4.2 (Realization Theorem, [4, 5, 13, 30, 49]). JL◦ = ML.
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If JL◦ = ML, then JL is called the justification counterpart of ML. The justifi-
cation counterpart of Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic EGL is introduced in [28]. EGL is
an extension of J4 by the explicit Lo¨b axiom schema:6
s : (t : A→ A)→ t : A.
It is proved that EGL◦ = GL. This, together with Solovay’s arithmetical complete-
ness of GL ([54]), implies the arithmetical provability completeness of EGL,
EGL →֒ GL →֒ PA,
in which t : A is interpreted as “A is provable in PA.”
5 Fixed points in justification logics
In this section we study the effect of adding fixed points to justification logics. Some
justification logics inherits the fixed point property from GL. For example, the logic
of proofs and provability GLA (see [6, 46]) is such a logic. GLA has axioms and
rules of GL and LP (in their joint language), together with axioms t : A → A,
¬t : A → ¬t : A, t : A → A, and the reflection rule: from ⊢ A, infer ⊢ A. It
is obvious that every formula A(p, q¯) in the language of modal logic in which p is
modalized has a fixed point in GLA.
It is worth noting that a fixed point theorem for two operation-free logics of
proofs was given by Straßen in [58]. The systems considered there only use variables
as terms and have no term operations (such as · and +) and hence are not of interest
for current paper.
5.1 Justification logics with fixed point operators
Suppose JL is a propositional justification logic defined over a language L for which
the internalization and substitution lemma could be proved. An occurrence of a
propositional variable p is called justified in the formula A(p, q1, . . . , qn) if p occurs
in the scope of a justification operator :. Let L(FP) be the extension of L by n-ary
fixed point operators δA(q1, . . . , qn) for each L-formula A(p, q1, . . . , qn) in which p is
justified. The fixed point extension of justification logic JL, denoted JL(FP), in the
language L(FP) is an extension of JL by fixed point axiom schemes
δA(B1, . . . , Bn)↔ A(δA(B1, . . . , Bn), B1, . . . , Bn),
where B1, . . . , Bn are L(FP)-formulas.
The definitions of constant specification and JL(FP)CS are similar to those of JL.
It is easy to verify that the deduction theorem holds in JL(FP)CS , for arbitrary CS,
the substitution lemma holds in JL(FP)T CS and JL(FP)∅, and the internalization
lemma holds in JL(FP)CS , for axiomatically appropriate CS.
Next the analogs of the Knower and the Believer Paradoxes are formulated in
the framework of justification logics.
6 Another explicit version of Lo¨b axiom is considered in [27, 28] of the form s : (t : A→
A)→ lob(s, t) : A, in the extended language of J4 by binary term operator lob(., .).
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Theorem 5.1. Let JL be a propositional justification logic which contain the axiom
scheme
jT. t : A→ A,
then JL(FP)T CS is inconsistent.
Proof. In the following we derive a contradiction in JL(FP) using the fixed point
axiom for the formula A(p) = ¬x : p.
1. δ ↔ ¬x : δ, by fixed point axiom where δ = δA
2. x : δ → ¬δ, from 1 by propositional reasoning
3. x : δ → δ, an instance of jT
4. ¬x : δ, from 2, 3 by propositional reasoning
5. δ, from 1, 4 by propositional reasoning
6. t : δ, from 5 by the internalization lemma
7. t : δ → ¬δ, from 2 by the substitution lemma
8. ¬δ, from 6, 7 by MP
9. ⊥, from 5, 8. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5.2. Let JL be a propositional modal logic which contain the axiom schemes
jD. ¬t : ⊥,
j4. t : A→!t : t : A,
then JL(FP)T CS is inconsistent.
Proof. Consider the fixed point axiom for the formula A(p) = ¬x : p.
1. δ ↔ ¬x : δ, by fixed point axiom where δ = δA
2. δ → ¬x : δ, from 1 by propositional reasoning
3. t : (δ → ¬x : δ), from 2 by the internalization lemma
4. t : (δ → ¬x : δ)→ (x : δ → t · x : ¬x : δ), an instance of jK
5. x : δ → t · x : ¬x : δ, from 3, 4 by MP
6. t · x : ¬x : δ → ¬!x : x : δ, by lemma 4.4
7. x : δ → ¬!x : x : δ, from 5, 6 by propositional reasoning
8. x : δ →!x : x : δ, an instance of j4
9. ¬x : δ, from 7, 8 by propositional reasoning
10. δ, from 1, 9 by MP
11. t : δ, from 10 by the internalization lemma
12. t : δ → ¬δ, from 1 by the substitution lemma
13. ¬δ, from 11, 12 by MP
14. ⊥, from 10, 13. ⊓⊔
For example the logics JT(FP)T CS , LP(FP)T CS , and JD4(FP)T CS are inconsis-
tent. In the following, we will show that J4(FP) is consistent. First we extend the
definition of forgetful projection to L(FP).
Definition 5.1. The forgetful projection ◦ of Definition 4.3 is extended to the lan-
guage with fixed point operators as follows:
(δA(B1, . . . , Bn))
◦ = δA◦(B
◦
1 , . . . , B
◦
n).
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Lemma 5.1. Given a constant specification CS for J4(FP) and a formula F in the
language of J4(FP), if J4(FP)CS ⊢ F , then K4(FP) ⊢ F
◦.
Proof. By induction on the proof of F in J4(FP)CS . We only check the case that F
is a fixed point axiom. Suppose p is justified in the J4-formula A(p, q¯), and F is
δA(B1, . . . , Bn)↔ A(δA(B1, . . . , Bn), B1, . . . , Bn),
for J4(FP)-formulas B1, . . . , Bn. Hence,
F ◦ = δA◦(B
◦
1 , . . . , B
◦
n)↔ A
◦(δA◦(B
◦
1 , . . . , B
◦
n), B
◦
1 , . . . , B
◦
n).
Since p is justified in A(p, q¯), p is modalized in A◦(p, q¯). Therefore, for the fixed
point operator δA◦(q¯) we have
K4(FP) ⊢ δA◦(C1, . . . , Cn)↔ A
◦(δA◦(C1, . . . , Cn), C1, . . . , Cn),
for every K4(FP)-formulas C1, . . . , Cn. Thus, for K4(FP)-formulas B
◦
1 , . . . , B
◦
n we
have
K4(FP) ⊢ δA◦(B
◦
1
, . . . , B◦n)↔ A
◦(δA◦(B
◦
1
, . . . , B◦n), B
◦
1
, . . . , B◦n).
Therefore, K4(FP) ⊢ F ◦. ⊓⊔
Corollary 5.1. Given a constant specification CS for J4(FP), J4(FP)CS is consis-
tent.
Proof. Suppose J4(FP)CS is inconsistent, J4(FP)CS ⊢ ⊥. Then, K4(FP) ⊢ ⊥
◦, and
thus K4(FP) ⊢ ⊥, which means K4(FP) is inconsistent, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Other fixed point extensions of justification logics are not known to be consistent.
The following lemma is an EGL counterpart of the fixed point equation (5),
(A→ A)↔ A, in GL.
Lemma 5.2. The EGL-formula F (p) = c · t : (p → A) has the fixed point t : A in
EGLT CS , where c : (A→ (t : A→ A)).
Proof. 1. c : (A→ (t : A→ A)), by IAN
2. c · t : (t : A→ A)→ t : A, an instance of explicit Lo¨b axiom
3. c : (A→ (t : A→ A))→ (t : A→ c · t : (t : A→ A)), an instance of jK
4. t : A→ c · t : (t : A→ A), from 1, 3 by MP
5. c · t : (t : A→ A)↔ t : A, from 2, 4 by propositional reasoning. ⊓⊔
5.2 Justification µ-calculus
In the previous section we showed that the fixed point extension of some of the
justification logics is inconsistent. In this section, we try to find a consistent fixed
point extension of these logics, based on µ-calculus.
First we introduce a justification version of the modal mu-calculus K(µ), called
J(µ). The language of J(µ) is an expansion of the language of J. Terms of J(µ) are
defined similar to the terms of J by the following grammar:
t ::= xi | ci | t · t | t+ t.
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Formulas of J(µ) are formed by the following grammar:
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧ A | t : A | µp.A,
where p is a propositional variable, t is a term, and in µp.A the formula A is p-
positive. We also assume to have the usual definitions for ¬, ∨, → and ↔ as logical
connectives in the above language. ⊥ is defined as A ∧ ¬A for some J(µ)-formula
A. In addition νp.A is defined as before:
νp.A := ¬µp.¬A(¬p).
J(µ) is axiomatizable by adjoining to the basic justification logic J the closure
axiom scheme µ-CL and the induction rule µ-IND from Section 3.2. The definitions
of constant specification and J(µ)CS are similar to those of JL.
It is easy to verify that the deduction theorem holds in J(µ)CS , for arbitrary CS,
and the substitution lemma holds in J(µ)T CS and J(µ)∅. Note that the internaliza-
tion lemma does not hold in J(µ) in its general form.
Lemma 5.3 (Internalization Lemma for J(µ)). Given an axiomatically appro-
priate constant specification CS for J(µ), if J(µ)-formula F is derivable in J(µ)CS
without the use of rule µ-IND, then there is a justification term t such that J(µ)CS ⊢
t : F .
Next by translating J(µ) into modal µ-calculus K(µ) we show that J(µ) is con-
sistent.
Definition 5.2. The forgetful projection ◦ of Definition 4.3 is extended to the lan-
guage of J(µ) as follows: (µp.A)◦ := µp.A◦.
Lemma 5.4. Given a constant specification CS for J(µ), for every J(µ)-formula A,
if J(µ)CS ⊢ A, then K(µ) ⊢ A
◦.
Proof. By induction on the proof of formula A in J(µ)CS .
Corollary 5.2. Given a constant specification CS for J(µ), J(µ)CS is consistent.
Proof. Suppose J(µ) is inconsistent, J(µ)CS ⊢ ⊥. Thus, by Lemma 5.4 we have
K(µ) ⊢ ⊥◦, or K(µ) ⊢ ⊥, which would contradict the consistency of K(µ). ⊓⊔
Since the modal part of the µ-calculus K(µ) can be consistently extended to
other modal logics, such as T, S4, S5, we can consistently add other justification
axioms to J(µ). For example, LP(µ) is obtained by adding the term operator ! to
the language of J(µ) and the axioms jT and j4 to J(µ), and JT45(µ) is obtained by
adding the term operator ? to the language of LP(µ) and the axioms j5 to LP(µ).
The proof of consistency of JT45(µ) and LP(µ) is similar to the proof of Corollary
5.2.
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6 Fixed points in the quantified logic of proofs
So far we have only considered the propositional justification logics. There are two
known ways to introduce quantifiers in the logic of proofs:
1. Quantifiers over objects (which the objects are interpreted as elements of the
domain of models). Artemov and Yavorskaya [7] proved that first order logic of
proofs equipped with an arithmetical provability semantics is not axiomatizable.
Without the arithmetical provability semantics an axiomatic system for first
order logic of proofs is given in [8].
2. Quantifiers over justifications or proofs. Yavorsky [64] proved that the logic of
proofs with quantifiers over proofs equipped with an arithmetical provability se-
mantics (in which the justification assertions are interpreted by multi-conclusion
version of the Go¨del proof predicate in PA) is not axiomatizable. Without the
arithmetical provability semantics an axiomatic system for logic of proofs with
quantifiers over justifications is given by Fitting in [22, 25].
In the following we recall the Fitting’s quantified logic of proofs QLP. Then we
introduce fixed point extension of QLP, and formalize the Knower and the Surprise
Test Paradoxes in QLP.
6.1 Axiom system and basic properties of QLP
Instead of simple justification constants, Fitting uses primitive proof terms. In fact,
the language of QLP contains a countable set of primitive function symbols of various
arities. Primitive function symbols with arity 0 are indeed justification constants. A
primitive (proof) term is a term of the form fn(x1, . . . , xn), or simply f(x1, . . . , xn),
where fn is a primitive function symbol of arity n and x1, . . . , xn are justification
variables.
Let us first describe the language and axiom system of QLP− (a subsystem
of QLP), and then those of QLP. Justification terms and formulas of QLP− are
constructed by the following grammars:
t ::= xi | f
n(x1, . . . , xn) | t · t | t+ t | !t,
A ::= p | ⊥ | ¬A | A ∧A | A ∨ A | A→ A | t : A | (∀x)A | (∃x)A,
where i, n are non-negative integers, x, xi’s are justification variables, t is a justifi-
cation term, and fn(x1, . . . , xn) is a primitive proof term. Note that the universal
quantifier quantifies over justification variables. The definition of free and bound
occurrences of variables and substitution of variables by terms are as in the first
order logic.
Axioms and rules of QLP− are a combination of axioms and rules of first order
logic and logic of proofs LP. More precisely, axioms of QLP− are:
Taut. All tautologies of propositional logic,
Q1. (∀x)A(x)→ A(t), where t is free for x in A(x),
Q2. (∀x)(A→ B(x))→ (A→ (∀x)B(x)), where x does not occur free in A,
Q3. A(t)→ (∃x)A(x), where t is free for x in A(x),
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Q4. (∀x)(A(x)→ B)→ ((∃x)A(x) → B), where x does not occur free in B,
jK. s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ (s · t) : B),
jT. t : A→ A,
j4. t : A→!t : t : A,
Sum. s : A→ (s+ t) : A , s : A→ (t+ s) : A,
Rules of QLP− are Modus Ponens, Generalization, and Axiom Necessitation rule:
A A→ B
B
MP,
A
(∀x)A
Gen,
A is an axiom instance
f(x1, . . . , xn) : A
AN,
where f(x1, . . . , xn) is a primitive term.
Fitting’s quantified logic of proofs is an extension of QLP− by first adding a
binary term operator, called uniform verifier, as follows: if t is a term and x is a
justification variable, then (t∀x) is a term. The occurrence of x in (t∀x) is considered
to be bound. Thus justification terms of QLP are constructed by the following
grammar:
t ::= xi | f
n(x1, . . . , xn) | t · t | t+ t | !t | (t∀x).
QLP in addition has the following axiom, called uniformity formula UF:
(∃y)y : (∀x)t : A→ (t∀x) : (∀x)A,
provided that y does not occur free in t or A, and Quantified Necessitation rule:
A
(∃x)x : A
qNec
provided that x does not occur free in A.
Definition 6.1. 1. The total primitive term specification for QLP (QLP−) is the
set of all formulas of the form f(x1, . . . , xn) : A, where A is an axiom instance
of QLP (QLP−) and f(x1, . . . , xn) is a primitive term.
2. A primitive term specification F for QLP (QLP−) is a subset of the total prim-
itive term specification for QLP (QLP−).
3. A primitive term specification F for QLP (QLP−) is called axiomatically appro-
priate if for each axiom instance A of QLP (QLP−) there is a primitive term
f(x1, . . . , xn) such that f(x1, . . . , xn) : A ∈ F .
Let QLPF (QLP
−
F ) be the fragment of QLP (QLP
−) where the Axiom Necessita-
tion rule only produces formulas from F . Thus QLP∅ (QLP
−
∅ ) denotes the fragment
of QLP (QLP−) without the Axiom Necessitation rule.
It is easy to show the following (see [25]).
Theorem 6.1. Given a primitive term specification F , the Justified Universal Gen-
eralization rule:
t : A(x)
(t∀x) : (∀x)A(x)
JUG
is admissible in QLPF .
19
Proof. Suppose QLPF ⊢ t : A(x). By Gen, we get QLPF ⊢ (∀x)t : A(x). Then by
qNec, we get QLPF ⊢ (∃y)y : (∀x)t : A(x), for a variable y where does not occur free
in t or A. By axiom UF and MP, we obtain QLPF ⊢ (t∀x) : (∀x)A(x) as desire. ⊓⊔
In fact, the original axiomatization of QLP in [25] has the rule JUG instead of
Gen and qNec.
It is worth noting that a restricted version of the rule qNec is admissible in
QLP−.
Theorem 6.2. For the total primitive term specification F , the following rule is
admissible in QLP−F :
A is an axiom instance
(∃x)x : A
where x does not occur free in A.
Proof. Suppose A is an axiom instance of QLP−F . By AN, we get QLP
−
F ⊢ c : A.
Then, by axiom c : A → (∃x)x : A, where x does not occur free in A, we have
QLPF ⊢ (∃x)x : A as desire. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6.1 (Internalization Lemma for QLP). Let F be an axiomatically ap-
propriate primitive term specification. If QLPF ⊢ F , then there is a justification
term t such that QLPF ⊢ t : F .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of F in QLPF (similar to the
proof of Lemma 4.2). The only new cases are when F is obtained by the rules Gen
and qNec.
For the case of Gen, suppose F = (∀x)A is obtained from A. By the induction
hypothesis, there is a term u such that u : A is derivable in QLPF . Using Gen, we
have (∀x)u : A. Then by qNec, we get (∃y)y : (∀x)u : A, for a variable y where does
not occur free in u or A. By axiom UF and MP, we obtain (u∀x) : (∀x)A(x). Thus
it suffices to put t := (u∀x).
For the case of qNec, suppose F = (∃x)x : A is obtained from A, where x does
not occur free in A. By the induction hypothesis, there is a term u such that u : A is
derivable in QLPF . By axiom j4 and MP, we get !u : u : A. Since u : A→ (∃x)x : A
is an instance of axiom Q3, by AN we get c : (u : A→ (∃x)x : A) for some constant
c. Now from the latter and !u : u : A and axiom jK, we get c·!u : (∃x)x : A. Thus it
suffices to put t := c·!u. ⊓⊔
As you can see from the above proof in order to obtain an internalized version
of the Generalization rule we need the uniformity formula. Therefore, in general the
internalization property does not hold in QLP−. However we have a restricted form
of the internalization lemma.
Lemma 6.2 (Internalization Lemma for QLP−). Let F be an axiomatically
appropriate primitive term specification. If F is derivable in QLP−F without the use
of rule Gen, then there is a justification term t such that QLP−F ⊢ t : F .
Fitting [25] gives a translation from propositional modal logic S4 into QLP as
follows.
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Definition 6.2. The mapping ∃ from S4-formulas into QLP-formulas is defined as
follows: p∃ = p, ⊥∃ = ⊥, ∃ commutes with propositional connectives, (A)∃ =
(∃x)x : A∃. For a set S of modal formulas, let S∃ = {F ∃ | F ∈ S}.
Theorem 6.3 ([25]). For every S4-formula A,
S4 ⊢ A ⇔ QLP ⊢ A∃
The same correspondence, A = (∃x)x : A, is considered by Yavorsky in [64]
for his quantified logic of proofs qLP.
If we interpret the modality  as knowledge (i.e. F read as “F is known”),
then the translation A ⇋ (∃x)x : A gives the following (related) interpretations
of knowledge:
1. Proof-based interpretation of knowledge, where knowledge of A means “there is
a formal proof for A” or “A is provable” (indeed this interpretation is provided
by Yavorsky’s qLP).
2. Evidence-based interpretation of knowledge, where knowledge ofAmeans “there
is an evidence (or justification) for A” (indeed this interpretation is provided
by Fitting’s QLP).
Although the evidence-based interpretation of knowledge satisfies the principle
of knowledge veracity, (∃x)x : ϕ → ϕ, the proof-based interpretation does not.
In fact, since mathematical proofs can be considered as certain evidences, proof-
based knowledge implies evidence-based knowledge, but not vice versa. Note also
that having evidence-based (or proof-based) knowledge of a statement is only a
sufficient condition for having knowledge of that statement.
6.2 Fixed point extensions of QLP
Next let us turn to the fixed point extension of QLP. If we define the fixed point
extension of QLP as the one for propositional justification logics in Section 5.1 (i.e.
fixed point axioms are defined for formulas with justified occurrences of proposi-
tional variables), then Theorem 5.1 already shows that this fixed point extension is
inconsistent. According to Definition 6.2, it is natural to define fixed point axioms
for formulas with boxed occurrences of propositional variables (this is similar to one
defined for fixed point extensions of modal logics in Section 3.1).
The propositional variable p is called ∃-justified in the QLP-formula A(p, q¯) if
each occurrences of p in A(p, q¯) is in the scope of (∃x)x : ..., for some variable x. To
put it otherwise, if all occurrences of (∃x)x : ..., for some variable x, in the QLP-
formula A(p, q¯) is replaced by , then p is ∃-justified in A(p, q¯) if all occurrences
of p are in the scope of  in A(p, q¯). For example, p is ∃-justified in the following
formula
A(p) = (∃x)x : p ∨ (∃y)y : ¬p.
Now extend the language of QLP by fixed point operators δA(q¯), for each QLP-
formula A(p, q¯) in which p is ∃-justified. The fixed point extension of QLP, denoted
by QLP(FP) is obtained by adding the fixed point axioms:
δA(B¯)↔ A(δA(B¯), B¯)
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where p is ∃-justified in A(p, q¯), and B¯ is a list of QLP(FP)-formulas.
In the rest of this section it is useful to consider intermediate systems between
QLP and QLP(FP). Given the QLP-formula A(p, q¯) in which p is ∃-justified, first
extend the language of QLP by single fixed point operator δA(q¯), and then define
the logic
QLP(δA(B¯)↔ A(δA(B¯), B¯))
to be the extension of QLP with single fixed point axiom δA(B¯) ↔ A(δA(B¯), B¯).
This notion is useful when we are dealing with the extension of QLP with a single
particular fixed point axiom.
The definition of primitive term specification, QLP(FP)F , and QLP(F )F , for
fixed point axiom F , is similar to those of QLP. All the definitions given above can
be stated for QLP− instead of QLP as well.
6.3 The Knower Paradox in QLP
Using the idea of evidence-based interpretation of knowledge, the Knower Paradox
was redeveloped in [2, 17, 19] within Fitting’s quantified logic of proofs QLP. The
Knower Paradox
D ↔ ¬K(pDq) or D ↔ ¬D,
is expressible in QLP by the formula:
D ↔ ¬(∃x)x : D.
We give the proof of the Knower in a fixed point extension of QLP.7
Theorem 6.4 (The Knower Paradox in QLP). Let δ be the fixed point operator
of the formula A(p) = ¬(∃x)x : p. Then
QLP(δ ↔ ¬(∃x)x : δ)∅
is inconsistent.
Proof. Recall that QLP(δ ↔ ¬(∃x)x : δ)∅ does not contain rule AN.
1. δ ↔ ¬(∃x)x : δ, fixed point axiom
2. ¬(∃x)x : δ → δ, from 1 by propositional reasoning
3. (∃x)x : δ → ¬δ, from 1 by propositional reasoning
4. x : δ → δ, an instance of axiom jT
5. (∀x)(x : δ → δ), from 4 by Gen
6. (∀x)(x : δ → δ)→ ((∃x)x : δ → δ), an instance of axiom Q4
7. (∃x)x : δ → δ, from 5, 6 by MP
8. ¬(∃x)x : δ, from 3, 7 by propositional reasoning
9. δ, from 2, 8 by MP
10. t : δ, from 9 by the internalization lemma (Lemma 6.1)
11. t : δ → (∃x)x : δ, an instance of axiom Q3
7 In contrast to the proofs of the Knower paradox in QLP given in [17, 18, 19], the proof
of Theorem 6.4 (similar to the original proof of the Knower paradox in Theorem 2.6) is
expressed without any hypothesis.
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12. (∃x)x : δ, from 10, 11 by MP
13. ⊥, from 8, 12. ⊓⊔
Note that the above proof cannot be proceeded in QLP−, since we use the
internalization lemma (in step 10) on a provable sentence δ which uses Gen (in step
5) in its proof. Moreover, the formula (∃x)x : δ in step 12 can be directly derived
from δ (in step 9) by qNec.
Theorem 6.5 (The Knower Paradox in QLP−). The logic
QLP−(δ ↔ ¬(∃x)x : δ)∅
is consistent.
Proof. See Appendix C. ⊓⊔
The Knower Paradox was also studied in [18] in the framework of Fitting’s
quantified logic of proofs from [22, 24]. The quantified logic of proofs presented in
[22, 24] has the same language of QLP but instead of axiom UF and rule qNec it
contains the following axiom (called Uniform Barcan Formula):
(∀x)t : A(x)→ (t∀x) : (∀x)A(x),
where x does not occur free in t. Dean and Kurokawa presented some arguments
against this axiom, and suggest to resolve the Knower Paradox by abandoning it.
Theorem 6.4 implies that QLP(FP) is inconsistent.
Corollary 6.1. QLP(FP)∅ is inconsistent.
Dean and Kurokawa in [17, 18] give an arithmetical interpretation for QLP−,
and show the arithmetic soundness of QLP−: the interpretation of every formula
provable in QLP− is true in the standard model of arithmetic. Nonetheless, it is not
clear how fixed point operators of QLP−(FP) are related to fixed point sentences of
PA. Having shown this connection, it is perhaps possible to prove that QLP−(FP)
is consistent. We leave the details for future work.
6.4 The Surprise Test Paradox in QLP
In this section we analyze the Surprise Test Paradox in the framework of QLP, when
we have an evidence-based interpretation of knowledge in mind.
Since the test is supposed to be surprise for students (and not for non-students),
it is helpful to consider a multi-agent version of QLP. Suppose A = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is a set of agents. The language of multi-agent quantified logic of proofs QLPn is
similar to QLP with the difference that formulas are constructed by the following
grammar:
A ::= p | ⊥ | ¬A | A ∧ A | A ∨ A | A→ A | t :s A | (∀x)A | (∃x)A,
where s ∈ A. The justification assertion t :s A is read “the agent s considers t as a
justification (or reason) for A.” Axioms and rules of QLPn are those of QLP where
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“ : ” is replaced by “ :s ” everywhere, for arbitrary agent s in A. One can show
that QLPn is consistent, by giving a translation from the language of QLPn to the
language of QLP that maps t :s A into t : A.
Now it is natural to interpret a surprise statement A as a statement for which
there is no justification or reason. This can be expressed in QLP as ¬(∃x)x : A.
More precisely,
“A is a surprise for s” ⇋ “s has no reason for A” ⇋ “¬(∃x)x :s A”
The above definition of surprise is not claimed to be an exceptionless definition
for a surprise event in everyday life; rather, it seems it is natural in the context of
this paradox, i.e., a test is surprise for a student if she does not know based on any
evidence the date of the test.
To keep the notation simple, we consider a class with only one student s and
use “ : ” instead of “ :s ”. In the sequel we formalize various versions of the Surprise
Test Paradox in QLP and its fixed point extensions.
First consider the Kaplan-Montague self-reference one-day case of the paradox,
the Examiner Paradox:
“Unless you know this statement to be false, you will have a test tomorrow,
but you can’t know from this statement that you will have a test tomorrow.”
This sentence was formalized in Section 2 as follows:
D ↔ (K(p¬Dq) ∨ (E ∧ ¬K(pD → Eq))), (6)
where E denotes the sentence “you will have a test tomorrow.” The sentence
(6) is expressed in QLP(FP) as follows:
δ ↔ [(∃x)x : ¬δ ∨ (E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E))]
where δ = δA(E) is the fixed point operator of the formula
A(p,E) = (∃x)x : ¬p ∨ (E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (p→ E)).
We show that the Examiner Paradox leads to a contradiction in QLP.
Theorem 6.6 (The Examiner Paradox in QLP). The logic
QLP(δ ↔ [(∃x)x : ¬δ ∨ (E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E))])∅
is inconsistent.
Proof. 1. δ ↔ [(∃x)x : ¬δ ∨ (E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E))], fixed point axiom
2. x : ¬δ → ¬δ, an instance of axiom jT
3. (∀x)(x : ¬δ → ¬δ), from 2 by Gen
4. (∀x)(x : ¬δ → ¬δ)→ ((∃x)x : ¬δ → ¬δ), an instance of axiom Q4
5. (∃x)x : ¬δ → ¬δ, from 3, 4 by MP
6. δ → ¬(∃x)x : ¬δ, from 5 by propositional reasoning
7. δ → E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E), from 1, 6 by propositional reasoning
8. δ → E, from 7 by propositional reasoning
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9. δ → ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E), from 7 by propositional reasoning
10. (∃x)x : (δ → E)→ ¬δ, from 9 by propositional reasoning
11. (∃x)x : (δ → E), from 8 by qNec
12. ¬δ, from 10, 11 by MP
13. (∃x)x : ¬δ, from 12 by qNec
14. δ, from 1, 13 by propositional reasoning
15. ⊥, from 12, 14. ⊓⊔
Note that the above proof cannot be proceeded in QLP−, since we use the rule
qNec (in steps 11 and 13). Moreover, It also give another proof for the inconsistency
of QLP(FP).
Theorem 6.7 (The Examiner Paradox in QLP−). The logic
QLP−(δ ↔ [(∃x)x : ¬δ ∨ (E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E))])∅
is consistent.
Proof. See Appendix C. ⊓⊔
Theorems 6.6, 6.7 gives a solution to the Kaplan-Montague self-reference one-day
case of the Surprise Test Paradox. The self-reference n-day case is similar.
Next consider the following self-reference one-day case of the paradox:
“You will have a test tomorrow, but you can’t know from this statement
that you will have a test tomorrow.”
This sentence can be expressed in QLP(FP) as follows:
δ ↔ [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E)]
where δ = δA(E) is the fixed point operator of the formula
A(p,E) = E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (p→ E).
We show that this announcement can not be fulfilled.
Theorem 6.8.
QLP(δ ↔ [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E)])∅ ⊢ ¬δ
Proof. 1. δ ↔ [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E)], fixed point axiom
2. δ → E, from 1 by propositional reasoning
3. δ → ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E), from 1 by propositional reasoning
4. (∃x)x : (δ → E)→ ¬δ, from 3 by propositional reasoning
5. (∃x)x : (δ → E), from 2 by qNec
6. ¬δ, from 4, 5 by MP. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6.9.
QLP−(δ ↔ [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E)])∅ 6⊢ ¬δ
Proof. See Appendix C. ⊓⊔
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Theorems 6.8, 6.9 gives a solution to the self-reference one-day case of the Sur-
prise Test Paradox. The self-reference n-day case is similar.
Now consider the self-reference two-day case of the paradox:
“A teacher announces that there will be exactly one surprise test onWednes-
day or Friday next week, but you can’t know from this statement the date
of the test.”
This sentence can be expressed in QLP(FP) as follows:
δ ↔ [E1 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E1)] ⊻ [E2 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ ∧ ¬E1 → E2)]
where E1 and E2 denote the sentences “you will have a test on Wednesday” and
“you will have a test on Friday” respectively, and δ = δA(E1, E2) is the fixed point
operator of the formula
A(p,E1, E2) = [E1 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (p→ E1)] ⊻ [E2 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (p ∧ ¬E1 → E2)],
and ⊻ denotes the exclusive disjunction.
Theorem 6.10.
QLP(δ ↔ [E1 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E1)] ⊻ [E2 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ ∧ ¬E1 → E2)])∅ ⊢ ¬δ
Proof. 1. δ ↔ [E1 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E1)] ⊻ [E2 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ ∧ ¬E1 → E2)], fixed
point axiom
2. δ ∧ ¬E1 → E2, from 1 by propositional reasoning
3. (∃x)x : (δ ∧ ¬E1 → E2), from 2 by qNec
4. δ → E1, from 1, 3 by propositional reasoning
5. (∃x)x : (δ → E1), from 4 by qNec
6. ¬δ, from 1, 5 by propositional reasoning. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6.11.
QLP−(δ ↔ [E1 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E1)] ⊻ [E2 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ ∧ ¬E1 → E2)])∅ 6⊢ ¬δ
Proof. See Appendix C. ⊓⊔
Finally consider the non-self-reference one-day case of the paradox as follows:
“You will have a test tomorrow that will take you by surprise, i.e. you can’t
know it beforehand.”
As Sorensen proposed in [55, 57] the above statement is an epistemic blindspot
for the students.8 An statement A is an epistemic blindspot for person s if and only
if A is true but not known by s, i.e. A ∧ ¬KsA. (Such sentences are also called
pragmatically paradoxical.) This statement can be expressed in QLP by
E ∧ ¬(∃x)x :s E. (7)
We show that it is provable in QLP− that the teacher’s announcement (7) is a
blindspot for the student s.
8 Binkley [10] presented the same analysis but in the doxastic modal logic KD4, and
conclude that the Surprise Test Paradox belongs to the same family as Moor’s paradox.
For a related discussion see also Quine’s argument in [48].
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Theorem 6.12.
QLP−F ⊢ ¬(∃y)y :s [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x :s E]
where F = {c :s (E ∧ ¬(∃x)x :s E → E)}.
Proof. Let F = E ∧ ¬(∃x)x :s E. We show that ¬(∃y)y :s F is provable in QLP
−
F .
1. F → E, a propositional tautology
2. c :s (F → E), from 1 by AN
3. c :s (F → E)→ (y :s F → c · y :s E), an instance of axiom jK
4. y :s F → c · y :s E, from 2, 3 by MP
5. c · y :s E → (∃x)x :s E, an instance of axiom Q3
6. y :s F → (∃x)x :s E, from 4, 5 by propositional reasoning
7. F → ¬(∃x)x :s E, a propositional tautology
8. y :s F → F , an instance of axiom jT
9. y :s F → ¬(∃x)x :s E, from 7, 8 by propositional reasoning
10. ¬y :s F , from 6, 9 by propositional reasoning
11. (∀y)¬y :s F , from 10 by Gen
12. ¬(∃y)y :s F , from 11 by reasoning in first order logic. ⊓⊔
But note that (7) is not necessarily a blindspot for others, i.e. we could consis-
tently have (∃y)y :s′ [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x :s E] for a non-student person s
′.
7 Conclusion
We have presented several fixed point extensions of justification logics: extensions
by fixed point operators, and extensions by least fixed points. There remained one
problem here. Is there a justification logic with the fixed point property, namely
a justification logic for which a fixed point theorem can be proved in its original
language? A complete affirmative answer to this question is not expected, since the
rule substitution of equivalents SE does not hold in justification logics (as noted in
the Introduction).
We have also presented fixed point extensions of Fitting’s quantified logic of
proofs, and formalize the Knower Paradox and various versions of the Surprise Test
Paradox in these extensions. By interpreting a surprise statement as a statement for
which there is no justification, we give a solution to the self-reference version of the
Surprise Test Paradox. Our analysis of theses paradoxes presumes evidence-based
interpretation of knowledge, that is to say knowledge of a fact means there is an
evidence for that fact. With regard to this fact, the paradoxes could be resolved in
QLP−, i.e by restricting the axioms and rules of quantified logic of proofs to those
of first order logic and LP.
In this respect, generally, we find both the rule qNec and the uniformity for-
mula UF problematic. The rule qNec when formulated for an agent s says: if A
is a theorem (of QLP), then s has an evidence for A. This implies that the agent
knows every theorem, which means that the agent is logically omniscient. Hence,
qNec is an acceptable rule only for idealized agents. However, we could suppose
that students in the Surprise Test Paradox are idealized agents, and try to solve
the puzzle in this setting. Thus, the only possible way to avoid the paradox is to
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reject the uniformity formula UF. This observation agrees with Dean-Kurokawa’s
analysis [19] which found the rule JUG suspicious.
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A The Surprise Test Paradox in timed modal epistemic
logics
In order to formalize the n-day case of the surprise test paradox, most authors (see
e.g. [10, 16, 34, 35]) uses temporalized knowledge operators such as Ki(p), intended
to mean that “the student knows on day i that p is true.”
Wang in [60] presented a family of timed modal epistemic logics, tMEL, with
timed knowledge operators KiF , for natural number i, meaning that “F is known
at time i.” The interpretation of timed knowledge operators in tMEL in possible
world semantics can be stated informally as follows: a proposition is known at time
i in a world w if and only if it is true at all worlds accessible from w and the first
time that the truth of the proposition is accepted is before or at i (for more details
cf. [60]).
Among various timed modal epistemic logics, we formalize the surprise test
paradox within timed modal epistemic logic tK.9 Formulas of tK are constructed by
the following grammar:
A ::= p | ⊥ | ¬A | A ∧ A | A ∨ A | A→ A | KiA,
where p is a propositional variable, and i is a non-negative integer. Axioms of tK
are as follows:
Taut. All tautologies of propositional logic,
tK. Ki(A→ B)→ (KjA→ KkB), where i, j < k,
Mon. KiA→ KjA, where i < j.
Rules of inference are modus ponens and the followings:
⊢ A
⊢ KiA→ KjKiA
(DE)
⊢ A
⊢ KiA
(E)
where in (DE) i < j. Axiom tK is a temporal counterpart of modal axiom K. The
monotonicity axiom Mon states that if one knows a statement at a time, then she
knows it at any later time. This principle does not hold in everyday life of course.
9 In the notation of Wang [60], tK is indeed a timed modal epistemic logic with com-
prehensive principal logical base. We do not state the details of the definition of base
and comprehensive principal logical base here, but let me only quote him: “Agents with
comprehensive logical bases are unrealistic. They know too much from the beginning.”
Thus, in this section we again suppose that students in the Surprise Test Paradox are
idealized agents, and try to solve the puzzle in this setting.
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In [60] the rules (DE) and (E) are called respectively Deduction by Epistemization
and Epistemization, and moreover (DE) is formulated as an axiom.
It is easy to verify that the deduction theorem holds in tK. In addition, the
following rule is admissible in tK:
⊢ A→ B
⊢ KiA→ KjA
(TKC)
for i < j. This rule is called Timed Knowledge Closure in [60], and is used to claim
that tK-agents (where tK are formulated by restricted forms of the rules (DE) and
(E)) are not logical omniscience. The following theorem of tK is also useful:
Ki(A ∧B)→ KjA ∧KjB, for i < j (8)
Now let us consider the non-self-reference two-day case of the Surprise Test
Paradox (the argument for n-day case is similar):
“A teacher announces that there will be exactly one surprise test onWednes-
day or Friday next week.”
Assume that teacher’s announcement is taken place at time 0, Friday class meeting
is at time 10, and Wednesday class meeting is at time 20. Teacher’s announcement
can be formalized as follows:
ϕ = (E1 ⊻E2) ∧ (E1 →
∧
0≤i<10
¬KiE1) ∧ (E2 → (
∧
0≤i<20
¬KiE2 ∧
∧
10<i≤20
Ki¬E1)),
where E1 and E2 denote the sentences “you will have a test on Wednesday” and
“you will have a test on Friday” respectively, and ⊻ denotes the exclusive or. Let us
formalize the first stage of the student’s argument in tK, that is the test cannot be
held on Friday. (Note that tK is indeed a logic of belief, and hence in the following
theorem KiA can be read as “A is believed at time i.”)
Theorem A.1. K1(E1 ∨ E2), ϕ ⊢tK ¬E2.
Proof. 1. K1(E1 ∨ E2), premise
2. ϕ, premise
3. E2, assumption
4. ¬K12E2, from 2, 3, by propositional reasoning
5. K11¬E1, from 2, 3, by propositional reasoning
6. (E1 ∨ E2)→ (¬E1 → E2), a propositional tautology
7. K1(E1 ∨ E2)→ K
2(¬E1 → E2), from 6 by rule (TKC)
8. K2(¬E1 → E2), from 1, 7 by MP
9. K12E2, from 5, 8 and axiom tK
10. ⊥, from 4 and 9.
Thus K1(E1 ∨E2), ϕ, E2 ⊢tK ⊥. By the deduction theorem, K
1(E1 ∨E2), ϕ ⊢tK
¬E2. ⊓⊔
Now consider the timed logic of knowledge tT, which is obtained from tK by
adding the following axiom:
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tT. KiA→ A.
The first stage of the student’s argument can be also formalized in tT as follows.
Theorem A.2. K1ϕ ⊢tT ¬E2.
Proof. 1. K1ϕ, premise
2. E2, assumption
3. ϕ, from 1 by axiom tT
4. ϕ→ (E1 ∨ E2), a propositional tautology
5. K1ϕ→ K2(E1 ∨ E2), from 4 by rule (TKC)
6. K2(E1 ∨ E2), from 1, 5 by MP
7. ¬K12E2, from 2, 3, by propositional reasoning
8. K11¬E1, from 2, 3, by propositional reasoning
9. (E1 ∨ E2)→ (¬E1 → E2), a propositional tautology
10. K1(E1 ∨ E2)→ K2(¬E1 → E2), from 9 by rule (TKC)
11. K2(¬E1 → E2), from 6, 10 by MP
12. K12E2, from 8, 11 and axiom tK
13. ⊥, from 7 and 12.
Thus K1ϕ,E2 ⊢tT ⊥. By the deduction theorem, K
1ϕ ⊢tT ¬E2. ⊓⊔
In order to formalize the student’s argument completely and eliminate the re-
maining day (here Wednesday), we employ an extension of tT. The timed modal
epistemic logic tS4 is obtained by adding the positive introspection axiom to tT:
t4. KiA→ KjKiA, where i < j.
It is not difficult to show that the following rule is admissible in tS4:
Ki1A1, . . . ,K
inAn ⊢ B
Ki1A1, . . . ,KinAn ⊢ KjB
(9)
where i1, . . . , in < j. Now let us continue the student’s argument and rule out the
remaining day Wednesday.
Theorem A.3. K1ϕ ⊢tS4 ¬E1.
Proof. 1. K1ϕ, premise
2. ¬E2, by Theorem A.2
3. ϕ, from 1 by axiom tT
4. E1 ∨ E2, from 3 by propositional reasoning
5. E1, from 2, 4, by propositional reasoning
6. K2E1, from 1-5 by rule (9)
7. E1 →
∧
0≤i<10 ¬K
iE1, from 3 by propositional reasoning
8. E1 → ¬K
2E1, from 7 by propositional reasoning
9. K2E1 → ¬E1, from 8 by propositional reasoning
10. ¬E1, from 6, 9, by MP ⊓⊔
In fact, lines 5 and 10 of the above proof get a contradiction from the assumption
K1ϕ.
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Theorem A.4. K1ϕ ⊢tS4 ⊥.
In order to avoid the paradox Quine [48] denies the premise K1ϕ. Indeed, by the
deduction theorem, we obtain ⊢tS4 ¬K1ϕ. This result agrees with Quine’s opinion
that students do not know that the announcement is true. On the other hand, if one
accepts the principle that “if someone is informed of a proposition, then he knows
it” (as explicitly formulated by Wright and Sudbury in [63]), then the above result
leads to a contradiction. (An extended discussion of Quine’s solution can be found
in [15].)
Kripke [35] also do not find Quine’s solution satisfactory. He says “But often, I
think, you do know something simply because a good teacher has told you so.” He
instead denies the monotonicity principle Mon. Quoting Kripke, “You may know
something now, but, on the basis of further evidence – without any loss of evidence
or forgetfulness – be led to fall into doubt about it later.” The monotonicity princi-
ple of knowledge also rejected by Sorensen [57] and Williamson [62]. For example,
Williamson says “[the students’] memory of examinationless days would undermine
their earlier knowledge of the truth of the announcement, like misleading evidence.”
The monotonicity principle is also considered by Binkley [10], Wright and Sudbury
[63] in the context of logics of belief. Wright and Sudbury rejected the monotonicity
principle too, “[the principle] is, manifestly, not analytic of reasonable belief. Good
reason to believe p may lapse as more information becomes available; or stronger
reason to believe the contrary may emerge” (cf. [63]).
However, one can observe that the monotonicity principle Mon does not play
any role in the students’ argument in our formulations (see the proofs of Theorems
A.2, A.3). There is another view in which the paradox is resolved by rejecting the
KK principle, here axiom t4 (see e.g. [32, 42]).10
B The Surprise Test Paradox in Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic
In this appendix we consider a version of the Surprise Test Paradox in which a
surprise event is interpreted in terms of deducibility. Specifically, a test is a surprise
for a student if and only if the student cannot deduce logically beforehand the date
of the test. One of the advantages of this meaning of surprise, as mentioned also by
Fitch [21], is that there is no need to use epistemological and temporal concepts.
We consider deducibility in PA and instead of formalizing the paradox in PA we give
a formalization in the provability logic GL.
Let us consider the following two-day version of the paradox (the argument for
n-day version is similar):
“There will be exactly one test on Wednesday or Friday next week and its
date will not be deducible from this statement.”
As discussed by Shaw [52] the paradox appears only if the teacher’s announcement is
self-reference. Regarding deducibility in PA, Fitch [21] formalized the paradox in PA.
Since all valid statements about the provability predicate of PA can be described by
the provability logic GL (see Theorem 3.1), we formalize the paradox in GL. Teacher’s
announcement can be expressed in GL by the following fixed point equation:
10 But this is criticized by Sorensen in [56].
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D ↔ [(E1 ∧ ¬(D → E1)) ⊻ (E2 ∧ ¬(D ∧ ¬E1 → E2))], (10)
where E1 and E2 denote the sentences “you will have a test on Wednesday” and
“you will have a test on Friday” respectively, and ⊻ denotes the exclusive or. The
structure of the fixed point D in (10) is not important here, but it can be computed
by algorithms presented in [11, 53, 51]. Following Fitch we show that the teacher’s
announcement D in (10) is self-contradictory (we sketch only a few of the formal
details here).
Theorem B.1. The fixed point D in (10) is refutable in GL.
Proof. The proof is as follows:
1. D ↔ [(E1 ∧ ¬(D → E1)) ⊻ (E2 ∧¬(D ∧¬E1 → E2))], By De Jongh-Sambin
Fixed Point Theorem 3.4
2. D → [(E1∧¬(D → E1))∨(E2∧¬(D∧¬E1 → E2))], from 1 by propositional
reasoning
3. D ∧ (¬E1 ∨(D → E1))→ (E2 ∧¬(D ∧¬E1 → E2), from 2 by propositional
reasoning
4. D ∧ ¬E1 → E2, from 3 by propositional reasoning
5. (D ∧ ¬E1 → E2), from 4 by Nec
6. D∧ (¬E2 ∨(D∧¬E1 → E2))→ (E1 ∧¬(D → E1)), from 2 by propositional
reasoning
7. D → E1, from 5, 6 by propositional reasoning
8. (D → E1), from 7 by Nec
9. ¬E1 ∨(D → E1), from 8 by propositional reasoning
10. ¬E2 ∨(D ∧ ¬E1 → E2), from 5 by propositional reasoning
11. ¬(E1 ∧¬(D → E1))∧¬(E2 ∧¬(D∧E1 → E2)), from 9, 10 by propositional
reasoning
12. ¬D, from 11 by propositional reasoning. ⊓⊔
Since the teacher’s announcement D is refutable, it implies everything. Partic-
ularly, it implies that the test will not be held on Friday. Fitch tried to resolve
the paradox by reinterpreting the surprise so that “what is intended in practice is
not that the surprise event will be a surprise whenever it occurs, but only when it
occurs on some day other than the last”. His reformulation of the paradox can be
expressed in GL by the following fixed point equation:
D ↔ [(E1 ∧ ¬(D → E1)) ⊻ (E2 ∧ ¬(D → E2))], (11)
He claims that the fixed point D in (11) is “apparently self-consistent” in PA.
Nevertheless, Kripke [35] (in a letter to Fitch) shows that the statement of Fitch’s
resolution is actually refutable in PA, and therefore it is not resolved as stated by
Fitch. The argument of Kripke can be formalized in GL as follows.
Theorem B.2. The fixed point D in (11) is refutable in GL.
Proof. The proof is as follows:
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1. D ↔ [(E1 ∧ ¬(D → E1)) ⊻ (E2 ∧ ¬(D → E2))], By De Jongh-Sambin Fixed
Point Theorem 3.4
2. ¬D → (D → Ei), a propositional tautology, where i = 1, 2
3. ¬D → (D → Ei), from 2 by modal reasoning, where i = 1, 2
4. ¬D → (¬Ei ∨(D → Ei)), from 3 by propositional reasoning, where i = 1, 2
5. ¬D → ¬(E1 ∧¬(D → E1))∧¬(E2 ∧¬(D → E2)), from 4 by propositional
reasoning
6. ¬D → ¬D, from 1, 5 by propositional reasoning,
7. (¬D → ¬D), from 6 by Nec
8. (¬D → ¬D)→ ¬D, an instance of Lo¨b scheme
9. ¬D, from 7, 8 by MP
10. ¬D, from 6, 9 by MP. ⊓⊔
Fitch also show the relation between the following version of the Surprise Test
Paradox and Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem:
“If this statement is deducible, then there will be exactly one test onWednes-
day or Friday next week and its date will not be deducible from this state-
ment.”
His reformulation of the paradox can be expressed in GL by the following fixed point
equation:
D ↔ [D→ (E1 ∧ ¬(D → E1)) ⊻ (E2 ∧ ¬(D ∧ ¬E1 → E2))], (12)
Theorem B.3. For the fixed point D in (12) we have GL ⊢ D ↔ ¬D and GL 6⊢ D.
Proof. The proof is as follows:
1. D ↔ [D → (E1 ∧ ¬(D → E1)) ⊻ (E2 ∧ ¬(D ∧ ¬E1 → E2))], By De
Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem 3.4
2. D → [D → (E1 ∧ ¬(D → E1)) ∨ (E2 ∧ ¬(D ∧ ¬E1 → E2))], from 1 by
propositional reasoning
3. D → (D ∧ ¬E1 → E2), similar to stages 2-4 of the proof of Theorem B.1
4. D→ (D ∧ ¬E1 → E2), from 3 by modal reasoning
5. D → D, an instance of axiom 4
6. D → (D ∧ ¬E1 → E2), from 4, 5 by propositional reasoning
7. D → (D → E1), similar to stages 5-7 of the proof of Theorem B.1
8. D→ (D→ E1), from 7 by modal reasoning
9. D → (D → E1), from 8 by modal reasoning
10. D → ¬D, similar to stages 7-12 of the proof of Theorem B.1
11. [D → (E1 ∧ ¬(D → E1)) ⊻ (E2 ∧ ¬(D ∧ ¬E1 → E2))] → D, from 1 by
propositional reasoning
12. ¬D → D, from 11 by propositional reasoning
13. D ↔ ¬D, from 10, 12 by propositional reasoning.
Finally note that if GL ⊢ D, then by Nec we get GL ⊢ D. On the other hand, from
GL ⊢ D ↔ ¬D we obtain GL ⊢ ¬D, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
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Thus, similar to Go¨del’s sentence (see (3) in the proof of Theorem 2.1), the fixed
point D in (12) states its own unprovability.
Kritchman and Raz [36] also show the relationship between the paradox and
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. They formalized a version of the paradox
and conclude that “if the students believe in the consistency of T + S, the exam
cannot be held on Friday [i.e. the last day], ... However, the exam can be held on any
other day of the week because [by the second incompleteness theorem] the students
cannot prove the consistency of T + S.” (where T can be taken to be PA, and S is
the statement of the teacher’s announcement).
C Semantics of QLP
Fitting in [25] presented Kripke-style possible world semantics for QLP. His se-
mantics is an extension of the LP possible world semantics of [23] by first order
semantics. In this part, we introduce models for QLP based on Mkrtychev models
(M-model for short) for LP [45], that are actually single-world Fitting models [25]
of QLP. We use the same notations of Fitting models of QLP here.
Definition C.1. An M-model for QLP−F is a quadruple M = (D, I, E ,V) such that
1. D is the domain of the model, a non-empty set (of reasons).
2. I is an interpretation function mapping each term operation to an operator on
D as follows.
(a) I assigns to each primitive function symbol f of arity n an n-place operator
fI : Dn → D; in particular, I assigns to each constant c a member cI of
D.
(b) I assigns to the verifier operation ! a mapping !I : D → D.
(c) I assigns to the application operation · a binary operation ·I : D×D → D,
and to the sum operation + a binary operation +I : D ×D → D.
Given a domain D, a valuation v is defined as a mapping from justification
variables to D. Given a domain D and an interpretation I, the valuation v can
be extended to all terms as follows (we use the notation tv instead of v(t)):
(a) xv = v(x), for variable x,
(b) f(t1, . . . , tn)
v = fI(tv1, . . . , t
v
n), for primitive function symbol f of arity n,
(c) (t · s)v = tv ·I sv,
(d) (t+ s)v = tv +I sv,
(e) (!t)v = !Itv.
3. E is an evidence function, that assigns to each reason in the domain D and to
each valuation a set of formulas, and satisfying the following conditions. For all
formulas A and B, all reasons r and r′ in D, and all valuations v:
(a) Application: If A→ B ∈ E(r, v) and A ∈ E(r′, v), then B ∈ E(r ·I r′, v).
(b) Sum: E(r, v) ∪ E(r′, v) ⊆ E(r +I r′, v).
(c) Proof checker: If A ∈ E(r, v), then t : A ∈ E(!Itv, v).
(d) Primitive proof term: A ∈ E(f(x1, . . . , xn)v, v), for every f(x1, . . . , xn) :
A ∈ F .
4. V is a truth assignment, i.e a mapping from propositional variables to set of
truth values {0, 1}.
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Definition C.2. An M-model M = (D, I, E ,V) for QLPF is an M-model for QLP
−
F
meeting the following conditions:
1. I assigns to the uniform verifier ∀ a mapping ∀I : D ×D → D. For an inter-
pretation I, and a valuation v put (t∀x)v = tv∀Ixv.
2. If A ∈ E(tv(
x
r), v
(
x
r
)
) for every r ∈ D, then (∀x)A ∈ E((t∀x)v , v).
3. If v and w agree on the free variables of A and r ∈ D, then A ∈ E(r, v) iff
A ∈ E(r, w).
Definition C.3. A valuation w is an x-variant of a valuation v if w is identical
to v except possibly on x. The notation v
(
x
r
)
denotes the x-variant of v that maps
x to r.
Definition C.4. The forcing relation v, for an M-model M = (D, I, E ,V) of
QLP−F and a valuation v is defined in the following way:
1. M v p iff V(p) = 1, for propositional variable p,
2. M 6v ⊥,
3. M v ¬A iff M 6v A,
4. M v A ∨B iff M v A or M v B,
5. M v A ∧B iff M v A and M v B,
6. M v A→ B iff M 6v A or M v B,
7. M v (∀x)A iff M v(xr)
A, for every r ∈ D,
8. M v (∃x)A iff M v(xr)
A, for some r ∈ D,
9. M v t : A iff A ∈ E(tv, v) and M v A.
A formula A is valid in an M-model M if M v A for every valuation v.
Definition C.5. An M-model M = (D, I, E ,V) for QLPF is called strong if it
satisfies the following condition: for every valuation v, if M v A, then A ∈ E(r, v),
for some r ∈ D.
Let us compare this condition with the fully explanatory condition of Fitting
models of QLP [25]. The fully explanatory condition says that if a proposition is
believed (at a state of a model), then it has a reason (at that state). While the
condition of the above definition says that if a proposition is true (in a model), then
it has a reason (in that model). This condition is plausible only for idealized agents.
It is not difficult to show the following.
Lemma C.1. SupposeM = (D, I, E ,V) is an M-model for QLPF . If the valuations
v and w agree on the free variables of A, then M v A iff M w A.
Since M-models of QLP− are single-world Fitting models of QLP−, the soundness
theorem of QLP− with respect to M-models is a consequence of Fitting’s soundness
theorem in [25].
Theorem C.1 (Soundness QLP−). Every formula provable in QLP−F is valid in
every M-model of QLP−F .
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The definition of interpretation of the uniform verifier, ∀I , given in Definition
C.2 is different from that given by Fitting for Kripke-style models of QLP in [25].
Thus, we prove the soundness theorem for QLP in more details.
Theorem C.2 (Soundness QLP). Every formula provable in QLPF is valid in
every strong M-model of QLPF .
Proof. We only show the validity of the uniformity formula. The proof of the validity
of other axioms are straightforward. SupposeM = (D, I, E ,V) is an strong M-model
for QLPF , and v is an arbitrary valuation, such thatM v (∃y)y : (∀x)t : A, where
y does not occur free in t or A. Then, for some r0 ∈ D, M w y : (∀x)t : A, where
w = v
(
y
r0
)
. Hence, M w (∀x)t : A. By Lemma C.1, since y does not occur free
in t or A, we have M v (∀x)t : A. Therefore, for every r ∈ D, M v(xr)
t : A. It
follows that, for every r ∈ D, A ∈ E(tv(
x
r), v
(
x
r
)
) and M 
v(xr)
A. Thus, (∀x)A ∈
E((t∀x)v , v) and M v (∀x)A. Hence, M v (t∀x) : (∀x)A.
Now we show that the rule qNec preserves validity. The proof of the validity
preserving of other rules are straightforward. Suppose A is valid in every strong
M-model of QLPF . LetM = (D, I, E ,V) be an strong M-model for QLPF , and v be
an arbitrary valuation. We will show M v (∃x)x : A, where x does not occur free
A. By the hypothesis, M v A. Since M is strong, A ∈ E(r, v), for some r ∈ D.
Since x does not occur free A, the valuations v and v
(
x
r
)
agree on free variables of
A, and hence A ∈ E(r, v
(
x
r
)
). Thus, M 
v(xr)
x : A, and so M v (∃x)x : A. ⊓⊔
Extending M-models to multi-agent quantified logic of proofs QLP−n (F), with
primitive term specification F , is straightforward. An M-model for QLP−n (F) is a
quadruple M = (D, I, E ,V) such that D, I, and V are defined as in Definition C.1,
but now E is a mapping from the set of agents A to evidence functions, i.e. for each
i ∈ A, E(i) (or Ei for short) is an evidence function as defined in Definition C.1
satisfying Application, Sum, Proof checker, and Primitive proof term conditions.
Moreover, clause 9 in the definition of forcing relation should be replaced by
M v t :i A iff A ∈ Ei(tv, v) and M v A.
Now it is easy to show the following.
Theorem C.3 (Soundness QLP−n ). Every formula provable in QLP
−
n (F) is valid
in every M-model of QLP−n (F).
In the sequel, as in Section 6.4, we consider a class with only one student s and
use “ : ” instead of “ :s ”. Thus, for simplicity, we reason in QLP
− instead of QLP−n .
Our purpose is now to show Theorems 6.5, 6.7, 6.9, and 6.11 by constructing
countermodels (using the soundness theorem). These theorems are restated here for
convenience:
QLP−(δ ↔ ¬(∃x)x : δ)∅ 6⊢ ⊥, (13)
QLP
−(δ ↔ [(∃x)x : ¬δ ∨ (E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E))])∅ 6⊢ ⊥, (14)
QLP−(δ ↔ [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E)])∅ 6⊢ ¬δ. (15)
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QLP−(δ ↔ [E1 ∧¬(∃x)x : (δ → E1)]⊻ [E2 ∧¬(∃x)x : (δ ∧¬E1 → E2)])∅ 6⊢ ¬δ (16)
Note that in all of the above theorems δ’s are fixed point operators. Therefore we
should actually extend the aforementioned semantics of QLP− to QLP−(FP), and
give semantic interpretation for fixed point operators. But let us simply assume for
now that fixed point operators are new propositional variables that are not in the
language of QLP−. Recall that for QLP−-formula F , QLP−(F ) denotes the extension
of QLP− by axiom F . Now it is easy to see the following soundness theorem for
QLP
−(F ).
Theorem C.4. Given a fixed point axiom F , every formula provable in QLP−(F )F
is valid in every M-model of QLP−F in which F is valid.
In order to show (13)-(15), define M-modelM = (D, I, E ,V) for QLP−∅ as follows:
1. let D be an arbitrary non-empty set, and I an arbitrary interpretation on D,
2. let E(r, v) = ∅ for all r ∈ D and all valuations v, and
3. let V(δ) = V(E) = 1, the precise value of other propositional variables does not
matter.
It is not difficult to show thatM is a model of QLP−∅ , and the following formulas
are valid in M
δ ↔ ¬(∃x)x : δ,
δ ↔ [(∃x)x : ¬δ ∨ (E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E))],
δ ↔ [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E)],
δ.
Now, using Theorem C.4 and the model M, (13)-(15) can be shown. In order to
show (16), consider the M-model M = (D, I, E ,V) defined as above, but in this
case put V(δ) = V(E1) = 1, and V(E2) = 0. It is not difficult to show that M is a
model of QLP−∅ , and the following formulas are valid in M
δ ↔ [E1 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ → E1)] ⊻ [E2 ∧ ¬(∃x)x : (δ ∧ ¬E1 → E2)],
δ.
Again, using Theorem C.4 and the model M, (16) can be shown.
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